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PLAYING THE LOTTERY: HCBS
LAWSUITS AND OTHER MEDICAID
LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED
Margaret K. Feltzt
LITIGATION CONCERNING Medicaid-funded services
for individuals with developmental disabilities has dramatically
increased in recent decades. Generally speaking, two categories
of litigation have emerged. Initially, Medicaid litigation focused
on the improvement of institutional services for mentally re-
tarded/developmentally disabled (MR/DD) individuals.' How-
ever, as the location for care provisions shifted from the institu-
tion to the home/community, there has been a parallel shift in
the litigation focus. Recent Medicaid litigation has concentrated
on the expansion of home and community-based service sys-
tems. With the majority of Medicaid-eligible individuals now
receiving services outside of the institutional setting, litigation
of the past few years has revolved around the prompt provision
of appropriate care in home and community environments.
This Note will discuss the maturation of Medicaid-funded
care delivery as embodied in home and community-based care
modalities. Litigation has been an essential tool and a driving
force in carving out home and community-based services for
developmentally disabled individuals. But, was litigation the
most effective tool to achieve these gains? If so, does it con-
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1 Theselawsuits date back three decades, to the 1970's. For examples of insti-
tution-based Medicaid litigation see infra Part ILA.
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tinue to be the most effective tool? What problems have arisen
as a result of employing a litigation approach to securing Medi-
caid home and community-based services? What alternatives
are there to litigation and how effective are they? How might
these alternatives be made more effective? Would a combina-
tion of approaches produce greater benefit?
By way of providing background, Part I of this Note will
supply a primer on the Health Care Financing Administration'S
2
home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver program.
Part II will discuss the current litigation climate with regard to
Medicaid-funded services for the developmentally disabled and
will discuss the relevant law with regard to Medicaid litigation.
Part III will discuss a recent Massachusetts case, Boulet v. Cel-
lucci, and will use the Massachusetts experience as a case study
for dissecting the litigation approach to securing Medicaid ser-
vices for the developmentally disabled. Part IV will discuss
widespread challenges inherent in HCBS waiver programs and
will analyze various approaches to securing Medicaid services.
In addition, this section will provide recommendations for ad-
vocates seeking to protect and provide for the needs of devel-
opmentally disabled individuals.
PART I: HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICES PRIMER
A. Creation of a Medicaid HCBS Waiver
Under § 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, States are al-
lowed to request waivers of certain federal requirements in or-
der to create alternative care and treatment modalities that are
Medicaid-financed. 3 "Waivers are intended to provide the flexi-
bility needed to enable States to try new or different approaches
to the efficient and cost-effective delivery of health care ser-
vices, or to adapt their programs to the special needs of particu-
2 As of July 1, 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDI-
CAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., INTRODUCING CMS (n.d.),
at http'//cms.hhs.gov/about/reorg.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). Much of this Note's
source material was cited when the agency was still HCFA and is titled as such.
Thus, this Note will still refer to the agency as the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion for the purpose of uniformity and a desire to not confuse the reader.
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (West Supp. 2001).
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lar areas or groups of recipients."4 Waiver can be obtained with
regard to three different requirements: services need not be pro-
vided statewide;5 States can use more liberal financial eligibility
criteria;6 and designated groups can be given benefits that other
groups are not eligible to receive.7
First authorized in 1981, HCBS waivers have become the
primary mechanism for States to provide Medicaid-funded,
community-based, long-term care services to the mentally re-
tarded, mentally ill, developmentally disabled, physically dis-
abled, and other target populations. In allowing for HCBS
waivers, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has
afforded States the "flexibility to develop and implement crea-
tive alternatives to placing Medicaid-eligible individuals in
hospitals, nursing facilities, or intermediate care facilities." 9
The Social Security Act specifically lists the services that may
be provided via HCBS waiver programs as follows:
[C]ase management services, homemaker/home health
aide services and personal care services, adult day
health services, habilitation services, respite care, and
such other services requested by the State as the Secre-
tary may approve and for day treatment or other partial
hospitalization services, psychosocial rehabilitation ser-
vices, and clinic services (whether or not furnished in a
facility) for individuals with chronic mental illness. 10
The rationale behind the waiver program is that by providing
these and other HCFA-approved services,11 the goal of preserv-
4 42 C.F.R. § 430.25(b) (2000).
5 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(1) (requiring a state plan for medical assistance
to be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State).
6 See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(l1 (requiring that a State employ a single stan-
dard in determining income and resource eligibility).
7 See id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (relating to comparability of services require-
ments).
8 STEVEN LuTZKY ET AL., LEWIN GROUP, INC., REVIEW OF THE MEDICAID
1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM LITERATURE
AND PROGRAM DATA 1 (June 2000), http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/litfinal.pdf.
9 HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES, HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 1915(C) WAIVERS 1 (n.d.), at
http'/www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hpg4.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
HCBS].
'0 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(4)(B).
1 HCFA maintains broad discretion over the approval of additional services
in a state waiver proposal. For example, in-home support services or special commu-
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ing the independence of developmentally disabled individuals
will be achieved. Mentally retarded/developmentally disabled
individuals will be allowed to remain in the community, main-
taining emotional ties to both family and friends, thereby im-
proving their quality of life.
While a State's HCBS waiver proposal must be HCFA-
approved, States retain great latitude in determining the compo-
sition and construction of a waiver. 12 Both medical and non-
medical services may be included under an HCBS waiver. Some
States have included the following services in their HCBS pro-
gram applications: adult day care, adult day habilitation ser-
vices, adult day health services, adaptive equipment, case man-
agement, personal care attendant services, habilitation services,
homemaker services, home health aide services, nursing care
services, personal care services, respite care, family training,
day treatment, and vocational services. 13 Individual States main-
tain broad discretion as to both the services that are included
and the populations that are served under the state waiver. The
design of the program and the selection of services under the
waiver are state-specific and services can be provided either on
a statewide basis or according to specific geographic designa-
tions and/or population definitions.' 4 Federal regulations pro-
vide for HCBS waiver programs to serve target populations
such as the elderly, 15 persons with physical disabilities, devel-
opmental disabilities, mental retardation, and mental illness.
16
Finally, States can design HCBS waiver proposals according to
specific conditions or illnesses, such as limiting services to in-
dividuals who are ventilator-dependent or who suffer from ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 17
nication services might be provided pursuant to HCFA approval. HCBS, supra note
9,1 3.
12 GARY A. SMITH, NAT'L ASS'N ST. DIRECTORS DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABILI-
TIES SERVS., INC., STATUS REPORT: LITIGATION CONCERNING MEDICAID SERVICES FOR
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES § II (Apr. 2001), http'//www.
qualitymall.orglonline/litigation.html.
13 LUrziKy ET AL., supra note 8, at 15-16.
4 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (governing waiver programs).
,5 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(d) (providing for home and community-based
services for the elderly).
16 HCBS, supra note 9, 5; see generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (governing
waiver programs).
See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396n(e) (permitting waiver programs for children who
are infected with AIDS or are drug-dependent at birth); see generally 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396n (governing waiver programs).
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States are permitted to determine not only the groups of
individuals that are covered under a particular waiver, but are
also permitted to determine the maximum number of individuals
to whom the State will offer services under the guise of a
waiver plan.' 8 Commonly known as a waiver "cap," federal
mandates require that a HCBS waiver proposal may not be lim-
ited to fewer than 200 individuals.19
Although a State is allowed tremendous flexibility in the
creation of an HCBS waiver proposal, the State must assure
HCFA that in implementing the waiver, the cost of providing
home and community-based services will not exceed the cost of
care in an institutional setting on a per capita basis. 20 Similarly,
once HCFA has approved the State's HCBS waiver proposal,
the State is obligated to provide all the listed services in accor-
dance with Federal Medicaid regulations and guidelines.2'
States must also assure HCFA that there are adequate safe-
guards in place to protect the health and welfare of individuals
served under the waiver.22
B. Current Status of HCBS Waiver Programs in the United
States
As Gary Smith, Director of Special Projects for the Na-
tional Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabili-
ties Services, Inc., has reported, the last thirty years have seen a
steady trend toward increased Medicaid funding coupled with
unprecedented Medicaid enrollment.23 Discretionary decision-
making on the part of state legislators and Medicaid directors
has resulted in the expanded availability of services and sup-
18 See 42 U.S.C.A § 1396n(c)(10) (establishing minimum guidelines for
waiver caps).19 L
20 HCBS, supra note 9, 6; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (permitting a
waiver provided that "under such waiver the average per capita expenditure estimated
by the State in any fiscal year for medical assistance provided with respect to such
individuals does not exceed 100 percent of the average per capita expenditure that the
State reasonably estimates would have been made in that fiscal year for expenditures
under the State plan for such individuals if the waiver had not been granted").
21 E.g., Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Cir. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 698 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that "when a state elects to provide an optional ser-
vice, that service becomes part of the state Medicaid plan and is subject to the re-
quirements of federal law").
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(A).
23 SMrrH, supra note 12, § II (stating that despite increased funding for com-
munity services, waiting lists for services have emerged).
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ports, requiring additional appropriations by the State. Looking
for creative ways to provide quality care and save (or better al-
locate) funds, many States have reduced or eliminated institu-
tional placements in favor of home and community-based ser-
vices programs.
The 1990's saw a "massive infusion" of funding into com-
munity service systems, principally via HCFA's HCBS waiver
mechanism.24 HCFA's first HCBS waiver program was ap-
proved in 1981.25 As of December 2000, there were 240 waiver
programs in the United States.26 Indeed, every State was repre-
sented in this count except for Arizona, which operates the
equivalent of a HCBS waiver program under the Social Security
Act's § 1115 "demonstration waiver" program.27 Between 1990
and 1999, the number of individuals receiving services under
the auspices of HCBS waivers increased from 45,000 to
262,000.28 At the same time, there was a ten-fold increase in
Medicaid spending during this decade, reaching a total of $8.4
billion in 1999.29
Many States fear that the movement toward HCBS waiver
programs may cause a "woodwork effect"-meaning that indi-
viduals who are currently being provided services and care by
family members will 'come out of the woodwork' and apply for
Medicaid community-based services through HCBS waivers. 30
Indeed, this prediction may turn out to be true. Many families
are experiencing intense frustration as they try to secure much-
needed Medicaid-funded HCBS services for a developmentally
disabled family member, while resisting placing that family
member in a long-term care institution. Despite States' clear
penchants for HCBS care modalities, lengthy waitlists and in-
241a
2 HCBS, supra note 9, 1 8.
26id
27a
2 SMITH, supra note 12, § It; see also MANJU KULKARNI, NAT'L HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: ACCESSING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SER-
vICES § llA (Mar. 2000) (describing a 200,000 person increase in those persons re-
ceiving home and community-based services based on waiver programs between
1990-1998), httpJ/www.healthlaw.org/pubs/2000003FactSheethcbw.html.
29 SMITH, supra note 12, § 11.
30 KULKARNI, supra note 28, § I; JANE PERKINS & MANJU KULKARNI, NAT'L
HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: ADDRESSING HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED
WAIVER WAITING LISTS THROUGH THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 1 (May 2000) httpJ/
www.healthlaw.org/docs/200005FactSheethcbw.pdf.
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sufficient caps 31 leave many otherwise eligible beneficiaries
without appropriate Medicaid-funded long-term care services.
This dearth of sufficient, timely, and appropriate services has
prompted many families to turn to litigation as a means of se-
curing community-based, Medicaid-funded, long-term care ser-
vices on behalf of a mentally retarded/developmentally disabled
family member.
PART H: LITIGATION CLIMATE AND RELEVANT
LAW
A. Background
Thirty years ago, litigation concerning Medicaid services
focused on reforms within institutions that provided long-term
care services to individuals with mental retardation and devel-
opmental disabilities. 32 The early 1970's saw numerous cases
alleging violations of the civil rights of institutionalized indi-
viduals with MR/DD.33 The vast majority of these cases alleged
that individuals were being forced to live in inhumane environ-
ments where neglect and physical, mental, emotional, and sex-
ual abuse abounded. The 1970's saw the filing of at least
twenty-one cases of this type.34 The following decade saw an
even greater proliferation of lawsuits, with at least thirty-two
such cases being filed.35
Class action lawsuits of a different sort emerged in the
early 1990's. While the allegations of mistreatment from the
31 For information on caps, see supra LA and infra BILC.4.
32 See LuTzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (listing the most influential cases).
33 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (holding the constitutional rights of mentally retarded residents at a state-
operated institution were violated due to inadequate rehabilitation), affd in part,
rev'd in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that mentally retarded students who carried hepatitis B were entitled to re-
admission to special education programs in public schools), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974) (holding
involuntary committed patients have a right, grounded in due process or the Eighth
Amendment, to a humane and safe living environment), affd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir.
1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding involuntarily
committed patients have a constitutional right to receive individual treatment that
provides a realistic opportunity for improvement of their condition), affd in part,
reversed in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
34 LuTrzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
35id.
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previous twenty years had not been eradicated, a new litigation
focus materialized and the lawsuits of the 1990's revolved
around the location of care delivery and the promptness of ser-
vice delivery.36 This paradigm shift was due, in large part, to a
deinstitutionalization trend. A strong advocacy movement intent
on improving the quality of life of MR/DD individuals by main-
streaming them and striving to maintain their emotional, famil-
ial, educational, and residential ties with the community also
had a profound impact.
B. Current Lawsuits
With the tremendous influx of federal and State Medicaid
funding, a movement away from providing services in the insti-
tutional setting, and a concurrent upsurge in the demand for
community-based Medicaid services, the Medicaid environment
of the 1990's was ripe for litigation. Dual goals emerged as the
litigation objective focused on securing prompt access to long-
term care services for the MR/DD individual and ensuring that
such services were delivered in the most appropriate setting.
While some States developed multi-year initiatives to address
the needs of MR/DD Medicaid beneficiaries, 37 other States
failed to answer the call and many individuals in need of Medi-
caid-funded services fell through the cracks. Disability advo-
cates wielded the tools provided to them in the Federal Medi-
caid Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Reha-
bilitation Services Act of 1973, and the United States Constitu-
tion, in attempts to obtain prompt and appropriate services in
the most integrated setting. Gary Smith has described the result-
ing litigation climate as having produced three interrelated cate-
gories of lawsuits: waiting list lawsuits, Olmstead lawsuits, and
access to benefits lawsuits. 38 As Smith notes, these three litiga-
tion approaches are far from distinct; frequently a particular
lawsuit will include arguments from two or even all three of
these categories. Smith's analysis, however, allows a clear
framework for dissecting and examining lawsuits aimed at se-
curing Medicaid-funded services for disabled individuals.
36 See id. at 4-5 (describing the Americans with Disabilities Act's requirement
that services be provided in the 'most integrated setting appropriate', its implication
on the waiver program, and subsequent cases).
37 For example, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland have done so. SMITH,
supra note 12, § IL
38 1i § I.
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Figure 1: Types of Medicaid-Related Litigation3 9
Type of Suit Description
Waiting List Lawsuits Allege that a State has failed to pro-
vide long-term Medicaid services
with 'reasonable promptness' to oth-
erwise eligible persons with devel-
opmental disabilities.
"Olmstead Lawsuits" Allege that institutionalized persons
have been improperly denied an op-
portunity to receive services in 'the
most integrated setting.'
Access to Benefits Allege that Medicaid recipients have
Lawsuits not been provided with or have been
unable to access services that they
have been authorized to receive.
1. Waiting List Lawsuits
Waiting list lawsuits typically assert that a State has vio-
lated federal law in failing to provide Medicaid-funded, long-
term services with reasonable promptness to otherwise eligible
individuals with developmental disabilities. 40 As of March
2001, there were waiting list lawsuits in fifteen states.41 Settle-
ment agreements had been reached in five lawsuits and litiga-
tion was pending in eleven states.42
39 Information adapted from SMIrH, supra note 12, § L
40 See generally iU § Im (describing arguments and cases falling into the wait-
ing list category).
41 Id § MIIB; see also fig.2.
42 See fig.2 (indicating settlement agreements with an asterisk).
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Figure 2: Waiting List Lawsuits as of March 200143
Lawsuit Medicaid ADA § 504 14th Description
Law Am.
Carpenter v. X X X X Filed in the U.S. District
Alaska Dep't of Court for the District of
Health and Soc. Alaska, this suit asserted
Servs. (Alaska). that the State's waitlisting
Brought in Jan. practice violates the ADA
2001 by private integration mandate and the
attorney on reasonable promptness
behalf of fif- provision of Federal Medi-
teen named caid law. Additionally, the
plaintiffs. State's failure to properly
process Medicaid applica-
tions denies due process.
Mandy R. v. X X X X Filed in U.S. District Court
Owens (Colo- for the District of Colorado,
rado). Brought this complaint pertained to
in Aug. 2000 the state practice of waitlist-
by private at- ing individuals for residen-
torney and the tial services. Approximately
Are of Colo- 2,700 individuals have been
rado as a class affected by this practice.
action. The State has filed a motion
for dismissal.
John/Jane Does X Filed on behalf of individu-
v. Bush origi- als waitlisted for ICF/MR
nally filed as services, this case became
Does v. Chiles) the prototype for subsequent
(Florida). waiting list and "reasonable
Brought in promptness" suits. In March
1992 as a class 1998, the Court of Appeals
action. for the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the district court
ruling that a waitlist for
ICFIMR services violated
Federal Medicaid law.
There has been no final
disposition of the case.
43 Information adapted from SMrrIH, supra note 12, § HLB.
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Wolf Prado-
Steinman v.
Bush (Flor-
ida).*
Makin v. State
(Hawaii)*
Brought in Dec.
1998 by Hawaii
Protection and
Advocacy
Agency as a
class action.
A settlement agreement has
been reached in this case, in
which the State has agreed
to serve all individuals who
were waiting for services on
July 1, 1999 by 2001. Addi-
tionally, the State is in the
process of negotiating a §
1915(b)/(c) waiver agree-
ment with HCFA to provide
expanded access to HCBS
services for eligible indi-
viduals.
This complaint alleged that
a waitlist for HCBS services
violated Federal Medicaid
law and ADA mandates. In
April 2000, a settlement
agreement was reached
wherein the State agreed to
increase the number of
individuals who would be
served in the HCBS waiver
program by approximately
70% over a three-year pe-
riod. The state legislature
approved an additional $4.3
million in funding to un-
derwrite initial stage of
expansion.
20021
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Boudreau v.
Ryan (Illinois).
Brought in
Sept. 2000 by
five named
plaintiffs with
MR/DD.
Boulet v. Cel- X X
lucci (origi-
nally filed as
Anderson v.
Cellucci) (Mas-
sachusetts)*
Brought in
Mar. 1999 by
private attor-
neys on behalf
of five named
plaintiffs as a
class action.
T I r r
Filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of
Northern Illinois, this suit
alleged violation of the
reasonable promptness
provision. Additionally,
plaintiffs claimed that the
State has not allowed eligi-
ble individuals freedom of
choice in selecting between
ICF/MR and HCBS waiver
services. The State has filed
a motion to dismiss, which
has not yet been ruled upon.
Pertaining to residential
services, this case asserted a
violation of Medicaid's
reasonable promptness
provision. Approximately
3,000 individuals comprised
the proposed plaintiffs'
class. In July 2000, the
District Court issued sum-
mary judgment in plaintiffs'
favor. The proposed class
definition was narrowed and
the State was directed to
furnish residential services
to class members within
ninety days unless able to
"show cause" why doing so
was not feasible. In Novem-
ber 2000, a settlement
agreement was reached in
principle, which was final-
ized on December 19, 2000.
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Travis D. v. X This suit alleged that the
Eastmont Hu- State failed to provide
man Servs. Ctr. HCBS waiver services to
(Montana). approximately 600 wait-
Filed in May listed individuals in the
1998 by the community along with resi-
Montana Pro- dents of the State's two
tection and public MR/DD institutions.
Advocacy Settlement discussions are
Agency. reportedly underway in this
case.
Lewis v. New
Mexico Dep't
of Health (New
Mexico). Filed
in Jan. 1999 by
the New Mex-
ico Protection
and Advocacy
Agency and the
Are of New
Mexico.
This suit alleged that the
State's failure to provide
Medicaid services in the
community to eligible dis-
abled individuals caused
them to either go without
services or to seek those
services only in an institu-
tional setting. Approxi-
mately 1,750 individuals
with developmental disabili-
ties were on the waiting list
for services in 1999; the
entire class of affected indi-
viduals numbers greater
than 3,000. In April 2000,
the federal district court
rejected the State's motion
to dismiss and upheld the
plaintiffs' right to access to
HCBS waiver services with
"reasonable promptness."
New Mexico has filed a
motion of intent to appeal
the district court decision to
the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Denver, CO
based on a sovereign immu-
nity claim under the Elev-
enth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
2002]
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Martin v. Taft
(originally filed
as Martin v.
Voinovich)
(Ohio). Filed in
1989 by the
Ohio Protection
and Advocacy
Agency as a
class action.
Staley v. Kitz-
haber (Ore-
gon)* Filed
Jan. 2000 as a
class action.
This complaint pertained to
the prompt provision of
residential services to
Medicaid-eligible individu-
als. In 1998, the parties
agreed to motion to stay
further district court pro-
ceedings. However, in July
2000, the Ohio Protection
and Advocacy Agency filed
a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment asking the
court to find that the State is
violating Federal Medicaid
law because the waiver
waiting list is not "moving
at a reasonable pace." It was
anticipated that the case
would go to trial in 2001.
This complaint alleged a
failure to furnish with rea-
sonable promptness Medi-
caid long-term services to
otherwise eligible individu-
als. In September 2000, the
parties agreed to settle the
suit, agreeing to implement
Oregon's "Universal Access
Plan." Submitted to the
Oregon legislature in Feb-
ruary 2000, the agreement
provides for a cumulative
total of $350 million by
2007.
[Vol. 12:181
PLAYING THE LOTTERY
Gross v. Hous-
ton (Pennsyl-
vania). Filed in
July 1999 as a
class action.
Delong v.
Houston (now
Penn. Protec-
tion and Advo-
cacy, Inc. v.
Houston (Penn-
sylvania). Filed
in Aug. 2000
by the Disabil-
ity Law Pro-
ject; Pennsyl-
vania Protec-
tion and Advo-
cacy Project.
This complaint alleged that
the State failed to provide
ICF/MR or equivalent resi-
dential services, opting
instead to waitlist eligible
individuals. Court-related
activity has been suspended
as a result of the Governor's
commitment to provide an
additional $850 million in
funding over the course of
the next five years.
Filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, this
suit pertained to state im-
plementation of the Per-
son/Family Directed Sup-
ports waiver program, a
component in the State's
waitlist reduction initiative.
The suit contended that the
State was required to pro-
vide services to 3,392 per-
sons during 1999-2000, but
failed to allocate a suffi-
cient number of slots under
the cap, thereby denying
services to otherwise eligi-
ble individuals. The State
filed a motion to dismiss the
suit, which was denied in
March 2001.
2002]
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Brown v. The
Tennessee
Dep't of Mental
Health and
Developmental
Disabilities and
Rukeyser (Ten-
nessee). Filed
in July 2000 by
the Tennessee
Protection and
Advocacy Pro-
ject as a class
action.
This complaint alleged that
the State failed to provide
ICF/MR or HCBS waiver
services with reasonable
promptness to approxi-
mately 850 otherwise eligi-
ble individuals with
MR/DD.
People First of X X X Filed in the U.S. District
Tenn. v. Neal Court for the Middle Dis-
(Tennessee). trict of Tennessee, this
Filed in Mar. complaint alleged that some
2001 by People 2,000 individuals with
First of Ten- MR/DD are currently and
nessee as a improperly waitlisted for
class action. HCB services, despite un-
der-enrollment based on the
state-established cap.
Quibuyen v. Filed in the U.S. District
Allen (Vir- Court for the District of
ginia). Filed in Virginia, this complaint
Dec. 2000 by a alleged that Virginia has
coalition of imposed restrictions on
attorneys. furnishing HCBS waiver
services, resulting in unrea-
sonable wait lists.
[Vol. 12:181
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The Arc of
Wash. State v.
Lyle Quasim
(Washington).
Filed in Nov.
1999 as a class
action.
This complaint alleged that
the waitlist for long-term
care services to individuals
with MR/DD violates Fed-
eral Medicaid law and the
ADA. In December 2000,
the District Court granted
the State's motion for sum-
mary judgment to deny the
plaintiffs' ADA claims
based on a "fundamental
alteration" defense. The
plaintiffs plan to raise ar-
guments related to service
entitlement and reasonable
promptness. Court proceed-
ings have been stayed while
the parties explore a settle-
ment agreement; if none is
reached, a trial date is set in
June 2001.
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Benjamin H. v.
Ohl (West
Virginia)*
Filed in Apr.
1999 as a class
action.
Pertaining to long-term care
services, this suit alleged
that services were not being
provided with reasonable
promptness. In July 1999,
the District Court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and
the defendants were ordered
to develop a compliance
plan that would: (1) elimi-
nate the waiting lists, (2)
establish reasonable time
frames for placing persons
into the waiver program, (3)
allow for freedom of choice,
(4) develop written policies
and procedures, and (5)
develop a plan for fair hear-
ings. In March 2000, the
court approved an agree-
ment pertaining to this or-
der.
* Settlement agreements reached by December 2000.
Waiting list lawsuits directly challenge the viability and le-
gality of a State maintaining a waiting list for Medicaid-funded
services. Provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act
(Federal Medicaid law), Title II of the ADA, and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973 all provide grounds for
challenging state-generated waiting lists for Medicaid-funded
services. Similarly, advocates have found a litigation vehicle in
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Generally, waiting list lawsuits rely on Title XIX's re-
quirement that States promptly provide Medicaid services to all
eligible individuals. Plaintiffs typically argue that the defen-
44 A discussion of 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clause
arguments relevant to waiting list lawsuits is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of the legal issues concerning reasonable promptness provisions, see
NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, REASONABLE PROMPTNESS AND THE PROVISION OF
SERVICES UNDER MEDICAID (n.d.), http'//www.healthlaw.org/pubs/200101prompt
ness.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
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dants (usually the state agency that administers Medicaid, the
commissioner(s) of the Medicaid Department, and/or the De-
partment of Mental Retardation, the governor, and others) have
caused unreasonable delay in the provision of institutional or
HCBS waiver services in violation of § 1396a(a)(8) and other
federal and state laws.45 Section 1396a(a)(8), the so-called "rea-
sonable promptness provision" of the Medicaid Act, specifically
requires that "[a] State plan for medical assistance must-
provide that all individuals wishing to make application for
medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do
so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals.'A 6
Accompanying regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) obligate the State to
"[f]urnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay
caused by the agency's administrative procedures," and
"[c]ontinue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible indi-
viduals until they are found to be ineligible." 47 Similarly regula-
tions mandate that "[t]he agency must establish time standards
for determining eligibility and inform the applicant of what they
are."'48 The outer limits on such time standards are determined
by regulations not to exceed "[n]inety days for applicants who
apply for Medicaid on the basis of disability," and "[florty-five
days for all other applicants. ' 49 Regulations also unambiguously
establish that an agency "must not use the time standards" as a
"waiting period" for Medicaid services.5 0
Courts have consistently held that § 1396a(a)(8) of the
Medicaid Act is enforceable under a § 1983 action. 5' Section
1983 imposes liability on anyone who, acting under the color of
state law, deprives a person of "any rights, privileges, or immu-
45 See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § Ui.B (describing waiting list litiga-
tion).
46 42 U.S.C.A § 1396(a)(8) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
47 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a)-(b)(2000).
48 Id § 435.911(a).
49 I. § 435.911(a)(1)-(2).
50 LI § 435.911(e)(1).
51 See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 715-19 (11th Cir. 1998); Lewis v.
New Mexico Dep't of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1232-36 (D.N.M. 2000); Sobky
v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1146-47 (E.D. Cal. 1994); see also Albiston v. Maine
Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 265 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a "reasonable
promptness" requirement in the statute governing Aid to Families with Dependent
Children creates rights enforceable under § 1983).
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nities secured by the Constitution and laws. 52 In Blessing v.
Freestone53 the court clarified the conditions under which an
individual might seek redress through a § 1983 action: "a plain-
tiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a
violation of federal law."54 The court further expounded:
We have traditionally looked at three factors when de-
termining whether a particular statutory provision gives
rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have in-
tended that the provision in question benefit the plain-
tiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and
amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously im-
pose a binding obligation on the States. In other words,
the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be
couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.55
A seminal case in waitlist litigation was Doe v. Chiles.56 In
this case, pursuant to § 1396 and its accompanying regulations,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Federal
Medicaid law does not permit a State to indefinitely waitlist in-
dividuals for Medicaid-funded services. The Doe court ruled
that Medicaid institutional services (i.e., services provided in a
nursing home or an intermediate care facility for the mentally
retarded57 ("ICF/MR") were no different than any other non-
waiver Medicaid service. The court mandated that Medicaid-
funded services-whether they were provided under the guise
of a waiver or not-be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all Medicaid-eligible individuals. While the Doe decision is
binding only in the Eleventh Circuit, the ruling has persuasive
52 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999).
5 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
Id at 340.
55 Id at 340-41 (citations omitted); see also Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (holding the Boren Amendment creates a federal right enforce-
able by health care providers under § 1983).
56 136 F.3d 709 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
57 The Code of Massachusetts Regulations lists ICF/MR's under the heading
of "Alternatives to Institutional Care" and defines them as follows: "Community
intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (or for persons with related con-
ditions) are small community-based residential programs for 15 or fewer residents."
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 130, § 433.482 (1994).
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value in other circuits and has become the foundation for much
of the subsequent waitlist litigation.
Waiting list lawsuits rely heavily upon the interconnected-
ness in Federal Medicaid law between institutional services
(i.e., services provided in a nursing home or ICF/MR) and
HCBS waiver services. Under federal law, a State may offer
HCBS waiver plans as an alternative to institutional care.58 In
order to receive HCBS waiver services, an individual must be
found to have been eligible to receive institutional services.
When this equivalency criterion is satisfied, States are permitted
to offer HCBS waiver services in lieu of institutional services.
The covered individual is allowed to elect receipt of services in
the institutional setting or the community setting. 59
In subsequent HCBS waitlist litigation, plaintiffs have built
an argument based on the Doe framework and have alleged that
an individual's eligibility for institutional services should also
permit him or her to receive equivalent services via an HCBS
mechanism. Other arguments in waitlist lawsuits allege that
state-imposed limits on the availability of both institutional and
HCBS waiver services have caused otherwise eligible individu-
als to forego services for which they have been deemed eligi-
ble.60 In an argument crafted under § 1902(a)(10) of the Social
Security Act,6 1 plaintiffs have argued that the State has failed to
make available comparable long-term services for all Medicaid-
eligible recipients, either by furnishing services to only a subset
of the population62 or by providing services only in the institu-
tional setting and not in the more inclusive community envi-
ronment.
63
Waiting list lawsuits have similarly challenged state prac-
tices with regard to the processing of Medicaid applications.
Some plaintiffs have alleged that States have effectively denied
disabled individuals the right to apply for Medicaid long-term
58 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n (West Supp. 2001) (governing waiver programs).
59 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (providing that "individuals who are
determined to be likely to require the level of care provided in a hospital, nursing
facility, or intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded are informed of the
feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the choice of such individuals,
to the provision of inpatient hospital services, nursing facility services, or services in
an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded").
60 See also infra Part ILB.3 (discussing access to benefits lawsuits).
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10).
62 See also infra Part ILB.3 (discussing access to benefits lawsuits).
63See also infra Part ILB.2 (discussing Olmstead lawsuits).
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services by not permitting formal applications for HCBS waiver
services and/or by not making prompt determinations with re-
gard to such applications. 64 Plaintiffs assert that in delaying
Medicaid applications or agency decisions on such applications,
States are effectively violating § 1902(a)(3) of the Social Secu-
rity Act by denying disabled individuals the right to appeal the
denial of Medicaid services. 65 In a similar vein, advocates are
arguing that application processing delays and denials of appli-
cations violate a disabled individual's 14th Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection rights under the U.S. Constitution.
2. "Olmstead Lawsuits"
So called "Olmstead Lawsuits" are based upon the integra-
tion mandate found in the United States Supreme Court's 1999
holding in Olmstead v. L.C.66 Generally speaking, the term
"Olmstead lawsuits" refers to litigation67 alleging that institu-
tionalized individuals "have been improperly denied the oppor-
tunity to receive community services in the 'most integrated
setting.' 68 The Court ruled in Olmstead that unnecessary segre-
gation of disabled individuals in institutional facilities consti-
tuted discrimination and thereby violated tlfe Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Olmstead's majority opinion, written
by Justice Ginsberg, concluded that the ADA requires a State to
deinstitutionalize disabled individuals, placing them in less re-
strictive community settings whenever: (a) treating profession-
als determine that a community placement is appropriate; (b)
the individual does not oppose the transfer from an institution to
the community; and (c) the placement can be reasonably ac-
commodated, taking into account factors such as the availability
of state resources and the needs of other disabled individuals. 69
Considerable overlap exists between Olmstead litigation,
waiting list litigation, and access to benefits litigation. Many
64 See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § ElI.B (describing waiting list law-
suits). 65 la
6527 U.S. 581 (1999).67 See generally SMITH, supra note 12, § IV (describing arguments and cases
falling into the "Olmstead lawsuits" category).
68 SMITH, supra note 12, § I; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000) (providing
regulation that a "public entity shall administer services ... in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities"); Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 591-92 (describing the 'integration regulation').
6901nstead, 527 U.S. at 587; SMITH, supra note 12, § IV.
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lawsuits allege that the delay in access to community services
and the insufficient number of community placements effec-
tively restricts a disabled individual's ability to seek care in
anything other than a restrictive, institutional setting.
Figure 3: Olmstead Lawsuits as of March 200170
Lawsuit Medicaid ADA § 504 14th Description
Law Am.
Brown v. Bush X X X X Plaintiffs sought declaratory
(Florida). Filed judgment and permanent
as a class ac- injunction to prevent the
tion. State from unnecessarily
institutionalizing individuals
with MR/DD. In March 1999,
the district court adopted
plaintiffs' proposed class
definition. Florida appealed
the court's class certification
to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, which
agreed that the class was
overly broad. The parties are
reportedly now negotiating a
reduction in the number of
individuals receiving institu-
tional services.
Inch v. Hum- Filed in Marion County Su-
phrey (Indi- perior Court (rather than
ana). Filed in federal district court) on
July 2000 by behalf of MR/DD individuals
the Indiana who were currently residing
Civil Liberties in nursing homes and/or who
Union as a were at risk of nursing home
class action. placement, this suit alleged
that 2,000 individuals are
either on waiting lists for
community services or were
suffering "unjustified institu-
tional isolation."
70 Information adapted from SMIr, supra note 12, § IV.
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Doe v. Ken-
tucky Cabinet
for Human
Servs. (Ken-
tucky). Filed
by the Ken-
tucky Protec-
tion and Advo-
cacy Agency
as a class ac-
tion.
Barthelemy v. X X
Louisiana
Dep't of
Health and
Hospitals
(Louisiana).
Filed in Apr.
2000 by five
plaintiffs and
Resources for
Independent
Living.
Rolland v.
Cellucci (Mas-
sachusetts).
Filed in Oct.
1998 by 7
MR/DD indi-
viduals; class
action for 858
MR/DD indi-
viduals.
x
I. 1-4
This suit alleged that the
State was not properly ad-
ministering the Medicaid Pre-
Admission Screening and
Resident Review ("PASRR")
process for MR/DD individu-
als, resulting in inappropriate
placements and provision of
services. The litigation
ceased when the parties
agreed to employ a consult-
ant to evaluate the PASRR
process and make recom-
mendations.
This complaint alleged that
restriction of available ser-
vices to "unnecessarily seg-
regated settings" violated §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Settlement talks are report-
edly underway.
Plaintiffs presented both an
ADA claim and a claim under
the 1987 Nursing Home Re-
form Law contained in Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987. In October
1999, the State agreed to
offer residential and special-
ized services to MR/DD
nursing home residents under
the terms of mediated settle-
ment agreement. Addition-
ally, $5.6 million was allo-
cated to fund the placement
process between FY 2000-FY
2001.
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01esky V.
Haverman
(Michigan).
Filed in Sept.
1999 by
Michigan
Protection and
Advocacy
Agency for six
named indi-
viduals with
MR/DD and/or
mental illness.
*I.
Persons with neurological
disabilities brought suit under
the State's Acquired Brain
Injury (ABI) HCBS waiver
program, alleging that the
NH Division of Developmen-
tal Services (DDS) operated
its long-term services pro-
gram with "inadequate,
capped funding" and that the
state administration of the
program failed to provide
services in a reasonably
prompt manner.
3. Access to Benefits Lawsuits
Access to benefits lawsuits allege that Medicaid recipients
have not been provided services or are unable to access services
that they are authorized to receive. 71 For example, an Arizona
case, Ball v. Biedess, 72 alleges that Medicaid payment rates for
community-based caregivers and professionals are inadequate to
enlist a sufficient number of community providers in order to
71 See generally SMrrH, supra note 12, § V (describing arguments and cases
associated with the access to benefits category).
72 No. CIV 00-67 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. 2000).
Bonnie B v.
Shumway
(New Hamp-
shire). Filed in
Dec. 1999 as a
class action.
2002]
In June 2000, this case was
referred to the U.S. District
Court for Western Michigan.
Plaintiffs' counsel estimates
that there are 500 individuals
in Michigan who should be
deinstitutionalized. Plaintiffs
allege a violation of the
Nursing Home Reform Act of
1987 and the ADA. The court
denied a state motion to dis-
miss based on Eleventh
Amendment grounds and
settlement discussions are
reportedly underway.
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ensure that Medicaid services are locally available to all those
who are authorized to receive them.73 Similarly, the Ball case
alleges that a lack of sufficient service providers places disabled
individuals at risk of having to return to a more restrictive insti-
tutional environment to receive necessary care. 74 Sanchez v.
Johnson,75 a California case, argues that differential payment
and benefit structures for institutional versus community-based
providers have had the effect of subjecting MR/DD individuals
to unnecessary institutional placements and have encouraged
discrimination on the basis of disability.
76
Figure
200177
4: Access to Benefits Lawsuits as of March
Lawsuit Medicaid ADA § 504 14th Description
Law Am.
Ball v. Biedess X X X Filed in federal district court,
(Arizona). this suit argued that Medicaid
Filed in Jan. payment rates for direct ser-
2000 by Ari- vice and support professionals
zona and Na- in the community were insuf-
tive American ficient to enlist enough pro-
Protection and viders to ensure Medicaid
Advocacy services were available to
Agencies. persons with disabilities eligi-
ble and authorized to receive
such services. The suit alleged
a violation of § 1902(a)(30)(A)
of the Social Security Act.
Additional arguments were
made regarding reasonable
promptness; amount, duration
and scope of services; and
patients' freedom of choice.
7' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(30)(A) (West Supp. 2001) requires that payments be
"consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care."
74 See also supra Part TI.B.2 (discussing Olmstead lawsuits).
75 No. 00-CV-01 593 (CW) (N.D. Cal. 2000).
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(30)(A) requires that methods and procedures for the
utilization of care and services be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality
of care."
77 Information adapted from SMrrH, supra note 12, § V.B.
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Sanchez v. X Filed in U.S. District Court for
Johnson (Cali- the Northern District of Cali-
fornia). Filed fornia, this complaint alleged
in May 2000. that differential payment and
wage and benefit structures
between institutional and
community-based providers
resulted in "unnecessary insti-
tutionalization and segrega-
tion," a violation of the ADA.
Wolf Prado- In May 2000, the parties en-
Steinman v. tered into an eighteen-point
Bush (Florida). settlement agreement address-
Filed by Flor- ing the provision of a full-
ida Protection range of HCBS waiver ser-
and Advocacy vices in addition to addressing
Agency. quality improvement, work-
load ratios, and provider pay-
ment rates.
_____________ I .L~ L
Filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, this class action
suit filed against the Louisiana
Department of Health and
Hospitals pertains to the
State's implementation of the
"Children's Choices" Medi-
caid HCBS waiver program for
children with MR/DD.
2002]
Malen v. Hood
(Louisiana).
Filed in Dec.
2000.
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Benjamin H. v. X X In addition to waitlist claims,
Ohl (West the plaintiffs in this suit re-
Virginia). Filed quested that the State increase
in Apr. 1999. its payment rates for HCBS
waiver services. The district
court ruled that the plaintiffs
did not marshal sufficient
evidence in support of their
claim, but expressed strong
concerns regarding the ade-
quacy of provider payment
rates. In part as a result of this
litigation, West Virginia offi-
cials have committed to con-
duct a thorough review of the
State's payment rates.
PART IH: CASE STUDY: BOULET V. CELLUCCI
A. Introduction
In March 1999, private attorneys from the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts filed a class action lawsuit in federal district
court on behalf of six named plaintiffs78 and their families who
were dissatisfied with the pace at which the State was reducing
the waiting list for HCBS residential services. The plaintiffs'
proposed class definition included "all mentally retarded or de-
velopmentally disabled individuals in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts who are not receiving or have not received
Medicaid services for which they are eligible." 79 The plaintiffs'
complaint alleged that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had
violated Federal Medicaid law and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act by failing to provide, with reasonable promptness,
Medicaid-funded residential services to otherwise eligible indi-
viduals and had instead indefinitely waitlisted those individuals
78 On May 25, 1999, lead plaintiff Valerie Anderson moved to dismiss her
claims without prejudice. Because of a deterioration of her health, she no longer re-
quested that the Commonwealth immediately provide her with residential habilitation
services. Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 n.1 (D. Mass. 2000). This left
five named plaintiffs.79 Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Boulet (No.
99-10617-DPW); Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
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for approved services. To remedy violations of the Federal
Medicaid Act, the United States Constitution, and the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights, plaintiffs sought permanent in-
junctive relief8° on behalf of approximately 3,000 mentally re-
tarded and developmentally disabled individuals who had been
waitlisted for approved services by the Commonwealth. 8'
B. Facts
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts participates in the
Federal Medicaid program and has committed to provide Medi-
caid services to both categorically needy and medically needy
populations. Pursuant to Federal Medicaid law,82 the Common-
wealth's HCFA-approved Medicaid plan provides for eligible
individuals to receive services in an intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR). Similarly, the Common-
wealth's plan provides for HCBS waiver services in lieu of
ICF/MR services as detailed in the Commonwealth's waiver
application to HCFA. The Federal Medicaid Act permits the
inclusion of such services under the auspices of a waiver provi-
sion:
The Secretary may by waiver provide that a state plan
approved under this subchapter may include as "medical
assistance" under such plan payment for part or all of
the cost of home or community-based services (other
than room and board) approved by the Secretary which
are provided pursuant to a written plan of care to indi-
viduals with respect to whom there has been a determi-
nation that but for the provision of such services the in-
dividuals would require the level of care provided in
a[n] . . .intermediate care facility for the mentally re-
tarded the cost of which could be reimbursed under the
State plan.83
80 Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J. at 1, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW). According to the plaintiffs' attorneys, "monetary damages [were] inadequate
to cure [the] harm, and [were] also unavailable by operation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment." Id at 30.
' Id at 1.
82 42 U.S.C.A §§ 1396d(a)(15) (West Supp. 2001) (defining "medical assis-
tance"), 1396d(d)(3) (defining ICF/MR care as an optional service that may be pro-
vided in a State Medicaid plan).
' 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(1).
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Under its waiver plan, Massachusetts provides for residen-
tial habilitation services, 84 day services and supports, supported
employment services, transportation, and respite care. 85 Accord-
ing to the waiver application, eligible individuals under the
waiver plan include developmentally disabled individuals under
the age of eighteen and mentally retarded individuals age eight-
een and older who also meet the financial qualifications for eli-
gibility (i.e., meet the definitions of categorical need).86
In accordance with federal requirements, individuals are
eligible to receive waiver services, if, but for the provision of
these services, they would require the level of care provided in
an ICF/MR,87 and provided that HCBS services can be provided
at the same or lesser cost than that which would have been in-
curred in an institutional setting, such as an ICF/MR or a nurs-
ing home. Massachusetts's waiver plan provides that when an
individual "'is determined to be likely to require' the level of
care provided by an ICF/MR," the individual shall be given the
option of receiving services in either an institutional setting or
in the community.88 Finally, the Massachusetts waiver plan
guarantees individuals the opportunity for a fair hearing when
they are not given the choice of HCBS services instead of insti-
tutional care.
89
84 Massachusetts's waiver plan defines "residential habilitation" as:
[A]ssistance with acquisition, retention, or improvement [of] skills related
to activities of daily living, such as personal grooming, and cleanliness,
bed making and household chores, eating and the preparation of food, and
the social and adaptive skills necessary to enable the individual to reside in
a non-institutional setting. Residential habilitation as used herein includes
services and supports that assist individuals with mental retardation to gain
independence and skills to live in the community, including in their natu-
ral/family home. . . . Residential habilitation also includes services and
supports to others which enable the individual with mental retardation to
remain living with the family in the natural/family home and to prevent in-
stitutionalization of the individual ....
Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65-66 (D. Mass. 2000) (quoting letter from
Mark E. Reynolds, Acting Commissioner, Executive Office of Health and Human
Services, to HCFA 12 (May 22,2000)).
85 Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. at 4, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
861id
87 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
881id
89 Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. J. at 5, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
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In the Boulet lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged the Common-
wealth failed to provide needed and approved Medicaid-funded
services to more than 3,00090 MR/DD individuals residing in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Plaintiffs further alleged
that rather than provide necessary Medicaid-funded services,
the Commonwealth, through the Department of Mental Retarda-
tion (DMR), placed individuals on waiting lists for approved
services, frequently keeping an individual on the list for an ex-
tended period of time. Indeed, each of the original six named
plaintiffs in the Boulet lawsuit had been on DMR's waiting list
for at least three years at the time the lawsuit was filed, and
three of the plaintiffs had been on the waiting list for more than
ten years.
91
In fact, the Massachusetts DMR has 'maintain[ed] a waiting
list of individuals eligible for and in need of DMR services'
since at least 1988.92 At the end of fiscal year 1998, 3,014 indi-
viduals were on the Commonwealth's waiting list.93 Of those
listed, the 'vast majority' were 'in need of a residential ser-
vice.' 94 In fiscal year 1998, for example, DMR reported that
72% of waitlisted individuals were waiting for residential ser-
vices only and an additional 14% were waiting for residential
and day services.95 As District Judge Woodlock's opinion made
clear:
[T]he human side of this waiting list is far more compel-
ling than any statistics can convey. Aging individuals
live with elder caregivers. Young individuals remain at
home after leaving special education. Families are in
90 According to figures released by the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Retardation (DMR) at the end of fiscal year 1998 (July), there were 3,014 unserved
individuals on DMR's waiting list. MASs. DEP'T OF MENTAL RETARDATION, OFFICE
OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, REPORT ON THE USE OF FuNDs FOR SERVICES TO
INDIvIDUALS ON THE DMR WAIT LST 2 (Jan. 1999), available at http'J/www.dmr.
state.ma.us/waithtm.
91 At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs Valerie Anderson, Edmund
Boulet, and Richard Byers had each been on the waiting list for more than ten years.
Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4-7, Boulet (No. 99-
10617-DPW). Plaintiffs Robert and Bryan Dubord had waited more than nine years
and five years, respectively, for Medicaid-funded services. Id at 7-8. Plaintiff Bridget
Studley had waited for Medicaid services for more than three years. Id at 8-9.
92 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 66.93 d
94 id
95 Id
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crisis because they do not have the means or the natural
supports needed to care for their sons, daughters, sisters,
and brothers. Given the fact that mental retardation is a
life-long disability families are seeking services that
would create a secure future for their loved ones. Par-
ents who have cared for their children since birth have
dedicated their own lives in order to enrich their chil-
dren's lives. They have added their names to the DMR
waiting list, but their futures remain highly uncertain.
96
As DMR's own literature intimated, each of the named
plaintiffs on DMR's waiting list faced the real possibility that
her current caregiver would suddenly be unable to provide fur-
ther support due to incapacity or death. Such an eventuality was
not improbable, as DMR itself had estimated that approximately
43% of individuals on the Commonwealth's waiting list had
caregivers over the age of sixty.97 Furthermore, DMR noted that
"among that subset of older primary caregivers, more than half
are over 70 years of age, and approximately 16% are 80 years of
age or older."
98
Having realized the precarious position of many families
with mentally retarded/developmentally disabled children
/siblings, the Boulet lawsuit was brought on behalf of "all men-
tally retarded or developmentally disabled individuals in Mas-
sachusetts who [were] not receiving Medicaid services for
which they [were] eligible." 99 The plaintiffs' attorneys waged a
classic "waitlist lawsuit" attack,100 arguing that as a participant
in the Federal Medicaid program and as a recipient of federal
funds, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was required to
comply with provisions in the Medicaid Act. Specifically, the
96 Id at 66-67 (alteration in original).
97 Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J. at 9, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
98 Id
99 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
100 Indeed, in their May 6, 1999 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs allege that their action was "legally indistin-
guishable from a class action filed in Florida by developmentally disabled persons, in
which the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida officials violated section 1396a(a)(8) by
placing eligible individuals on a waiting list." Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ.
J. at 16, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW). The case to which these Massachusetts attor-
neys were referring was Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 712, 717 (11th Cir. 1998) (af-
firming district court's order requiring state officials to establish a 'reasonable wait-
ing list time period, not to exceed ninety days'); see supra Part II.B.1.
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plaintiffs' attorneys pointed to the "reasonable promptness"' 0'
and "fair hearing"1° provisions in the Federal Medicaid Act,
which require a state agency to allow any individual whose
claim for medical assistance under the plan was denied or not
acted upon with reasonable promptness, to request an opportu-
nity for a fair hearing. Predictably, in determining reasonable
promptness, the attorneys relied on federal regulations that gov-
ern the timeliness of agency response to applications and re-
quests for Medicaid assistance. 0 3
In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs specifically requested
that the court require the defendants, "to offer all plaintiffs the
full range of ICF/MR services or home and community-based
waiver services and other services for which they are eligible
within 90 days or some other specifically-defined, reasonably
prompt period."'1 4 The plaintiffs' attorneys argued that the
rights guaranteed by § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act were
enforceable in a § 1983 action. 10 5 Applying the elements of the
§ 1983 test established in Blessing v. Freestone,0 6 plaintiffs'
attorneys argued that Congress had intended the reasonable
promptness provision of the Medicaid Act to benefit the named
class of plaintiffs, that the rights outlined in the reasonable
promptness provision were "not so 'vague and amorphous' that
[their] enforcement would strain judicial competence," and that
the reasonable promptness provision unambiguously imposed
an obligation that was binding on the Commonwealth. 10 Fur-
thermore, citing to Doe v. Chiles,10 8 the plaintiffs asserted that
the implementing regulations helped define the meaning of
"reasonable promptness ' 10 9 and directed that plaintiffs should
101 Mer. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. at 13, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West Supp. 2001)).
102 Mem. in Supp. of P's Mot. for Summ. J. at 13-14, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3)).
103 See Mem. in Supp. of P1's Mot. for Summ. J. at 14-15, Boulet (No. 99-
10617-DPW) (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911,425.930(a) (2000)).
104 Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21, Boulet
(No. 99-10617-DPW).
105 Mem in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. L at 16-19, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
'06 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
107 Mem. in Supp. of Pi's Mot. for Summ. J. at 16, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
103 136 F.3d 709 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
109 Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. I. at 17, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
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not be forced to endure the "arbitrary and unpredictable lottery
for Medicaid services" 110 that was the Commonwealth's waiting
list, but should instead promptly receive services within the
home or community setting.
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted:
[T]he defendants' violation of section 1396a(a)(8) is not
excused by the fact that the various services at issue
here - ICF/MR care and waiver services - are optional
services that a participating state need not provide. Be-
cause the Commonwealth has committed to provide
these services as part of its Medicaid plan, it must com-
ply with the statutory "reasonable promptness" require-
ment in its provision of those 
services. 1 r 
C. District Court Ruling
1. Summary of Decision
In a July 14, 2000 decision, Judge Douglas P. Woodlock of
the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts certified the plaintiffs' proposed class, but amended the
class definition so as to include only MR/DD adults in the State
who were eligible to receive Medicaid services under the cap
established in the Commonwealth's waiver proposal and who
were also currently on the Commonwealth's waiting list for
such services. Granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and finding that that the defendants had not met their
obligation under § 1396a(a)(8) to provide residential habilita-
tion services with reasonable promptness, the court granted in-
junctive relief and ordered the defendants to provide services to
the plaintiffs within a ninety-day period. Leaving the door open,
Judge Woodlock permitted the defendants an opportunity to
show cause why the specified time period might be insufficient
to provide these services.
"0 Id at 23.
.' Id at 28.
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2. Enforceability of a § 1396a(a)(8) Claim Under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983
As a preliminary issue, Judge Woodlock determined, in ac-
cordance with several courts before him, that § 1396a(a)(8) pro-
vides a right that is enforceable under § 1983. Analyzing the
Boulet case under the framework established by Blessing v.
Freestone,112 Judge Woodlock explained that "in directing that
medical assistance 'shall be furnished with reasonable prompt-
ness to all eligible individuals,' Congress clearly intended to
protect those eligible individuals from undue delays."11 3 Pursu-
ant to part one of the Blessing test, he found that "the plaintiffs
... [were] intended beneficiaries of the provision."114
Judge Woodlock also found that part two of the Blessing
test was satisfied, relying on established First Circuit precedent:
A statute is not impermissibly vague simply because it
requires judicial inquiry into 'reasonableness.' . .
Rather, the relevant question is whether the action or
purpose whose 'reasonableness' is commanded has been
clearly delineated and is susceptible of judicial ascer-
tainment." The fact that the state retains considerable
discretion in determining the time period in which the
medical services will be provided does not render the
requirement of "reasonable promptness" unenforceable.
"While there may be a range of reasonable [time periods
for provision of assistance], there certainly are some
[time periods] outside that range that no State could
ever find to be reasonable . . .under the [Medicaid]
Act. 115
Judge Woodlock concluded that "[c]ertain periods of time, like
the three to ten or more years plaintiffs have been waiting, are
'far outside the realm of reasonableness'-a conclusion which a
court is perfectly capable of reaching."11 6
"
2 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
13 Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (D. Mass. 2000) (citation omit-
ted). 114 id
115 Id (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
116 Id; But see Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347, 360-64 (1992) (finding a re-
quirement of "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of children from their homes
and to facilitate reunification of families too vague for judicial enforcement).
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With regard to Blessing's third and final requirement,
Judge Woodlock found that the Medicaid statute unambiguously
imposed a binding obligation on the State and its agencies.
Judge Woodlock asserted that the requirement was mandatory,
rather than precatory, 117 and paralleled the 'federally imposed
obligation' found in statutory provisions of the Social Security
Act, which require States to provide Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children with reasonable promptness. 18 Regarding §
1396a(a)(8), he concluded, "[tihe mandatory language at issue
here unambiguously imposes an obligation upon Massachusetts
to furnish medical assistance 'with reasonable promptness.""
19
3. Defendants' Obligations Under Federal Medicaid Law
Having established that the plaintiffs had a right enforce-
able under § 1983, the court set out to rule upon the plaintiffs'
assertions that the defendants had shirked mandatory obliga-
tions promulgated under Federal Medicaid law. First the court
reiterated statutory underpinnings already addressed elsewhere
in this Note.120 Namely, the court upheld traditional statutory
analysis in holding that "once a state opts to implement a
waiver program and sets out eligibility requirements for that
program, eligible individuals are entitled to those services and
to the associated protections of the Medicaid Act."' 121 Citing to
the Eleventh Circuit Doe decision, Judge Woodlock opined that
"when a state chooses to provide an optional service, the service
'becomes a part of the state Medicaid plan and is therefore sub-
ject to the requirements of federal law. ' ,122 Also pertinent was
the Doe court ruling that "'[i]nadequate state appropriations do
not excuse noncompliance' with the Medicaid Act."'
123
The freedom of choice provision states:
[I]ndividuals who are determined to be likely to require
the level of care provided in a[n] . . . intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded are informed of the
"
7 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
118 I'L
119 Id
2 See supra Part ILB.1.
121 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
'
22 Id at 77.
123 Id. (alternation in original) (citing Doe v. Chiles 136 F.3d 709, 722 (11
Cir. 1998) (quoting Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 396 (5th
Cir. 1980))).
216 [Vol. 12:181
PLAYING THE LOTTERY
feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver, at the
choice of such individuals, to the provision of. . . ser-
vices in an intermediate care facility for the mentally re-
tarded' 24
This provision is clarified by its associated regulation,
which provide that recipients must be "[i]nformed of any feasi-
ble alternatives available under the waiver" and "[g]iven the
choice of either institutional or home and community-based ser-
vices. 125 Clearly, this "freedom of choice provision creates
binding obligations on any State that elects to provide supports
and services in homes pursuant to the Home and Community-
Based Waiver."'126 Indeed, "neither the hope of a future place-
ment after years on a waiting list nor an option which may not
meet an individual's needs constitutes a meaningful choice as
contemplated by § 1396n(c)(2). ' ,27
4. Impact of the Cap
How the cap on waiver services affects a mentally re-
tarded/developmentally disabled individual's ability to access
services for which he is eligible is confounding. Judge Wood-
lock stated that "[t]he cap on waiver services is simply a con-
straint on eligibility."'128 He noted that, "on a theoretical level, a
cap may be problematic":
[W]hile all eligible individuals are entitled to waiver
services, the statutory scheme allows a cap which may
prevent some of those eligible individuals from receiv-
ing the services they request. This theoretical construct
treats a cap as something distinct from the eligibility re-
quirements. As a practical matter, the statute can best be
read to mandate that, once a state chooses to implement
a waiver program and chooses the eligibility require-
ments, a cap is simply another eligibility requirement
for that program. . . . Individuals who apply after the
cap has been reached are not eligible, or alternatively,
124 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2001).
125 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
12 Cramer v. Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
'27 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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the waiver services are not "feasible" for them until the
cap has risen to include them. 129
Judge Woodlock therefore concluded that all of "the eligible
individuals under the cap are entitled to waiver services."' 3 Ac-
cordingly, because the state plan provides for ICF/MR services
under the waiver (as well as for other approved waiver services)
individuals under the cap are entitled to such services. 13'
The Commonwealth failed, in Judge Woodlock's estima-
tion, to provide in a reasonably prompt fashion the twenty-four
hour community-based residential services that plaintiffs had
requested and for which they were deemed to be eligible. "[T]he
assistance must correspond to the individual's needs, and ...
the state has recognized that those individuals on the waiting
list, and the named plaintiffs in particular, need the services for
which they are waiting."1 32 Accordingly, the provision of alter-
native services that did not rise to the level of requested or
needed services was simply insufficient. Furthermore, any
choice between institutional and home or community-
based services sanctioned in § 1396n(c)(2)(C) would be
rendered essentially meaningless if states which had im-
plemented a waiver program could escape the prompt-
ness requirement and other requirements that would
force them to make the waiver services available simply
by providing some other services or some other choice
to eligible individuals. 13
3
5. Feasibility of State-Generated Waiting Lists
Having determined that the reasonable promptness provi-
sion applied to all of the services sought by the plaintiffs, and
that the provision of alternate services did not satisfy Federal
Medicaid requirements, Judge Woodlock then turned to the vi-
ability of state-generated waiting lists, holding that "a determi-
nation that the waiting list violates the 'reasonable promptness'
requirement if settings are available for the services plaintiffs
129 Id.
130lid
'31 Id at 78.
132 Id at 79.
133 1d
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request follows ineluctably." 134 Judge Woodlock relied, in part,
on the United States Supreme Court decision concerning a par-
allel provision that governed distributions under Aid to Families
with Dependent Children:
That section was enacted at a time when persons whom
the State had determined to be eligible for the payment
of benefits were placed on waiting lists, because of the
shortage of state funds. The statute was intended to pre-
vent the States from denying benefits, even temporarily,
to a erson who has been found fully qualified for
aid. 3 5
Citing to Sobky v. Smoley, Judge Woodlock similarly relied
on Judge Levi's interpretation of this statement as applied to
Medicaid law, who had held "[i]t follows from Jefferson that
the Medicaid Act's reasonable promptness requirement, set
forth at § 1396a(a)(8), prohibits states from responding to budg-
etary constraints in such a way as to cause otherwise eligible
recipients to be placed on waiting lists for treatment." 136 Noting
that some plaintiffs had been waiting for requested services for
more than a decade, Judge Woodlock concluded that "defen-
dants have not been reasonably prompt [in providing services] if
facilities are available for offering the requested services."
137
The pfactice of placing individuals on a waitlist for necessary
services violated the intent of the Medicaid statute and its rea-
sonable promptness requirement.
6. Remedy
Judge Woodlock granted the plaintiffs' requested relief by
mandating the defendants provide Medicaid-funded services to
eligible individuals in a specifically defined, prompt time frame.
The judge adopted the ninety-day proposal propounded by the
plaintiffs, stating that "Massachusetts should be able to respond
to each new request for plan or waiver services by providing
those services within 90 days if the applicant is eligible, the
services are feasible, and settings are available for the delivery
134 id.
135 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972).
136 Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
137 Boulet, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
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of these services." 138 In making the ninety-day requirement
conditional upon the availability of resources, Judge Woodlock
left the door open for the defendants to argue that facilities were
not available to provide requested services. Indeed, Judge
Woodlock stated that "[t]he rulings in this case cannot create
new settings but they can and are intended to encourage vendors
to be willing to provide both the settings and the services to
meet the promise of the Massachusetts waiver plan by assuring
reimbursement up to the waiver cap." 139 In light of deficiencies
in the record with regard to the availability of services, particu-
larly in group home settings as requested by the plaintiffs, the
judge afforded the defendants an opportunity to "show cause..
. why 90 days [was] not a feasible timetable" for the transitional
order. 140
D. "Show Cause" Dispute
Defendants did, in fact, submit a memorandum in response
to the court's order to show cause. Plaintiffs' attorneys charac-
terized the defendants' submission as asking the court to "give
them open-ended discretion to maintain a waiting list indefi-
nitely."'1 ' In a very substantial reply, plaintiffs insisted that "[a]
specific, concrete transitional order [was] absolutely neces-
sary"'142 and went on to propose a detailed transitional order
with respect to residential habilitation services. Specifically,
plaintiffs requested that the court enter an order requiring the
defendants, on a transitional basis and within the proposed
ninety-day period, to take several specific steps to make these
services available:
1. allocate funding for residential habilitation services;
2. issue [Requests for Responses] and initiate other
measures for program development;
131 l at 82.
139 id
140id
141 P1's Reply to Def.'s Mem. in Resp. to the Ct.'s Order to Show Cause at 1,
Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
142 Id
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3. conduct planning meetings with all members of the
plaintiff class to identify an appropriate program model
for each plaintiff; and
4. provide interim services and supports until the plain-
tiff actually receives the requested residential habilita-
tion services. 14
3
Plaintiffs similarly requested that the court order periodic
progress reports from defendants. 44
E. Settlement Agreement
On December 19, 2000, the parties involved in the Boulet
litigation reached a settlement agreement.145 Approved by Judge
Woodlock, the agreement provides for a total of $114 million in
additional funding 146 over the course of the next five years: es-
sentially, $85 million in new money and $29 million in base
funds (i.e., money already in DMR's budget) were appropri-
ated.147 The settlement agreement provides services for all
plaintiffs, meaning each of the five remaining individually
named plaintiffs and all individuals with MR/DD who were on
the DMR waiting list as of July 14, 2000. As part of the settle-
ment agreement, the parties submitted an Assented-to Motion to
Modify the Plaintiff Class Definition, revising the definition
established by the district court judge in his July 14, 2000 rul-
ing. Where Judge Woodlock's definition of the plaintiff class
included 'all mentally retarded or developmentally disabled
adults in Massachusetts who are eligible to receive Medicaid
services under the plan's cap and who are currently on a waiting
list for such services,' plaintiffs' revised definition specified all
of the 2,437 persons who were on the DMR waiting list as of
July 14, 2000.148
143 Id. at3.
144 Id
145 Settlement Agreement, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
146 This additional funding is annualized. This means that once the funding
has been added to the state budget, it remains as an annual item in years to come.
Thus, over the course of a decade, for example, the funding will be worth close to $1
billion.
147 Settlement Agreement at 4-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
'48 Id at 2 n.1.
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Pursuant to the settlement agreement, beginning in fiscal
year 2002 and extending through fiscal year 2006, the "Defen-
dants agree[d] to request additional appropriations for the De-
partment of Mental Retardation (DMR) in a total amount of $85
million . . . to provide, purchase, or arrange for 1,250 new,
state-funded out-of-home placements and Interim Services for
the Plaintiffs."' 149 Additional appropriations were to be struc-
tured in the following manner:
Figure 5: Additional (New) Appropriations Under the
Settlement Agreement' 5°
Fiscal Year Appropriations Amount
2002 $22 million
2003 $18 million
2004 $15 million
2005 $15 million
2006 $15 million
Total $85 million
According to the settlement agreement, the Governor' 51
must request the additional appropriations for each fiscal
year. 152 If, for any given year, the legislature fails to designate
the entire amount of the additional appropriation, that out-
standing sum will be cumulatively added to the amount to be
requested in the following year. 53 Pursuant to the agreement,
the Governor's obligation to request additional appropriations
will not extend beyond fiscal year 2007.154
DMR, for its part, committed to use the funds appropriated
by the Massachusetts Legislature in a manner consistent with
the terms of the appropriations by agreeing to "provide, pur-
chase, or arrange for 1,250 new state-funded out-of-home place-
ments"'155 according to the following schedule:
149/ J at 5.
150 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
151 Massachusetts's current governor is Jane Swift.
152 Settlement Agreement at 6, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
153 id
54 iam
155 Id. "State-funded out-of-home placement" is defined as "group homes or
staffed apartments in the community, and family partnerships in the community." Id.
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Figure 6: New Residential Placements Under the Set-
tlement Agreement 156
Fiscal Out-of-Home Placements Funding Allocated
Year Based on New Funding
2002 250 $17 million
2003 275 $18.7 million
2004 250 $17 million
2005 250 $17 million
2006 225 $15.3 million
Total 1,250 $85 million
DMR likewise agreed to use $29 million in funds already
appropriated for use by the Massachusetts Legislature (i.e.,
"base funds") in a manner consistent with appropriations, com-
mitting to provide 675 out-of-home placements in existing
group homes, 157 staffed apartments, 158 shared living arrange-
ments,1 59 adult foster care with DMR support, 160 or family part-
nerships. 61 Specifically, DMR committed to provide out-of-
home placements as follows:
at 3. The definition does not include adult foster care or shared living arrangements,
nor does it include ICF/MR facilities.
156 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6-7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
157 "Group Home" is defined as "a residence operated by DMR or by a private
provider under contract with DMR that has two or more residents who are DMR
consumers and that provides services and supports for each resident." Id. at 4.
1'8 "Staffed Apartment" is defined as "a community-based apartment operated
by a private provider under contract with DMR that has one or more residents who
are DMR consumers and that provide services and supports for each resident." Id.
159 "Shared Living Arrangement" is defined as "an arrangement where a pri-
vate provider under contract with DMR arranges for a DMR consumer to live in the
home of a family or individual that provides services and supports to the DMR con-
sumer." Id.
160 "Adult Foster Care with DMR Supports" is defined as "the Medicaid State
plan service known as Adult Foster Care in which DMR funds are paid to supplement
program activities and expenditures." Icl
161 "Family Partnership" is defined as "a cooperative arrangement in which a
DMR consumer or his or her family provides or contributes toward the cost of a resi-
dence in which DMR provides or arranges for services." Id
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Figure 7: Residential Placements Based on Existing
Funds Under the Settlement Agreement
162
Fiscal Out-of-Home Placements Funding Allocated
Year Based on Existing Money
2002 125 $5,370,370
2003 125 $5,370,370
2004 125 $5,370,370
2005 150 $6,444,444
2006 150 $6,444,444
Total 675 $29 million
In addition to the new 1,250 out-of-home placements based
on new appropriations 163 and the 675 out-of-home placements to
be provided based on existing monies, 164 DMR agreed to "pro-
vide, purchase, or arrange out-of-home placements for 300
Plaintiffs in Fiscal Year 2001 using funds already appropriated
by the Massachusetts Legislature for this purpose in Fiscal Year
2001 .,,165 Furthermore,
[i]f a total of fewer than 2,225 Plaintiffs receive out-of-
home placements during the Term of this Agreement,
then DMR shall provide, purchase or arrange for the
remainder of the 2,225 out-of-home placements that
DMR has agreed to provide, purchase or arrange pursu-
ant to this Agreement to persons who were not on the
DMR Waiting List as of July 14, 2000.166
In addition to the provision of out-of-home/residential ser-
vices over the course of the next five years, the settlement
agreement also provides for the funding of interim services re-
quired for qualified individuals as they await placement in an
out-of-home setting. The Settlement Agreement mandates that
[b]eginning in Fiscal Year 2002... DMR will provide,
purchase or arrange for all of the Interim Services which
DMR determines that each individual Plaintiff needs
'
62 Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 7, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
'
63 See supra fig.6.
164 See supra fig.7.
165 Settlement Agreement at 9, Boulet (No. 99-10617-DPW).
166md
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while he or she waits for an out-of-home placement;
provided, however, that for each fiscal year covered by
the term of this Agreement, DMR shall not be obligated
to spend more money than appropriated [by the Massa-
chusetts Legislature at the behest of the Governor].
DMR will provide, purchase, or arrange for Interim Ser-
vices for each Plaintiff, as needed, until such time as the
individual Plaintiff moves into an out-of-home place-
ment. 16
7
The timeline and fiscal allocation for the provision of interim
services is as follows:
Figure 8: Interim Services Under the Settlement
Agreement 168
Fiscal # of Individuals Receiving New Funding Allo-
Year Interim Services cated
2002 1,550 $5,000,000
2003 1,150 $4,300,000
2004 775 $2,300,000
2005 375 $300,000
2006 0 $0
Total $11,190,000
Approved by Judge Woodlock on January 29, 2001, the set-
tlement agreement affords choice and predictability to MR/DD
individuals, provides a mechanism for pursuing residential
placement, develops a timeline for staff training, allows for
formal notice to individuals in need of services, provides for
formal rights of appeal and judicial review of care determina-
tions, and mandates quarterly progress reports' 69 from the
'67Id at 8-9.
'(' Adapted from Settlement Agreement at 6 app.A, Boulet (No. 99-10617-
DPW).
169 The Settlement Agreement mandates that
DMR shall submit reports to Class Counsel describing its activities under
this Agreement beginning on February 15, 2001 and continuing in three-
month intervals thereafter, on the fifteenth day of each third month,
through the term of this Agreement... DMR will also conduct meetings
every six months with Class Counsel for the purpose of informing Class
Counsel about the progress of its compliance with this Agreement.
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State. 70 Advocates lauded the outcome as "provid[ing] a posi-
tive outcome to a legal battle that began in March 1999.,,17
PART IV: APPROACHES TO SECURING
MEDICAID SERVICES
How positive was the outcome of the Boulet litigation?
Clearly, the plaintiffs saw significant gain in that more than
2,000 previously waitlisted individuals would receive desired
and necessary residential services within a five-year time frame.
But, what costs were attendant to this gain? What concerns
arose from the Boulet decision and settlement agreement? What
tools, other than litigation, might have either improved the Bou-
let outcome or enhanced the process and ultimate success of
these plaintiffs?
This first half of this section will discuss some of the spe-
cific issues that commonly arise in the creation of HCBS waiv-
ers. The second half will look to mitigating steps-some of
which were employed in the Boulet case-that can be taken to
improve outcomes for individuals and advocates that seek
Medicaid-funded HCBS waiver services for MR/DD individu-
als.
A. Some Issues Arising from the Creation of HCBS Waiver
Programs
1. Quality of Life and Quality of Care
Quality of life and quality of care are two distinct issues
that are not always compatible. 172 "[Q]uality of life addresses
the degree to which individuals are satisfied with their lives,
[whereas] quality of care refers to the degree to which the ap-
propriate care that is given will improve or maintain the indi-
vidual's level of functioning."'' 73 Not only are these two con-
cepts distinct, they can potentially be in conflict. For example,
factors that presumably promote quality of care, such as strict
care delivery regulations and protocols, can actually decrease an
ld. at 16.
170 Planning and Action Begin on Heels of Waiting List Settlement, ARC
MAss. ADvoc. (Arc Massachusetts, Waltham, Mass.), Spring 2001, at 1, 5.
"7' Id at 1.
172 LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 25.
173 id
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individual's quality of life by allowing less personal freedom or
individual autonomy. 174 Conversely, deficits in quality of care
can exacerbate and further diminish an individual's quality of
life; poor quality of care can lead to diminished quality of life
as evidenced by increased morbidity or premature mortality.175
Herein lies the struggle that dominates the provision of Medi-
caid-funded services-how do you provide care in the "least
restrictive setting," striving to promote autonomy, freedom, and
quality of life while still assuring quality of care, sufficiency in
the monitoring of care plans, and adequacy of staff training?
Some state administrators fear that equilibrium has not yet
been achieved in the HCBS care environment: the autonomous
home-care setting, while preferable to an institutional setting,
does not promote the active monitoring and assessment that pre-
sumably is more readily achieved in a large-scale care environ-
ment.176 Indeed, the holding in Olmstead mandated that the in-
tegrated, community-based setting that was least restrictive was
also the most preferable, but in avoiding the imposing regula-
tions found in institutional settings, guarantees of quality care
may be sacrificed. 177
Lutzky and colleagues, in a report prepared for HCFA, re-
viewed nationwide program literature and data related to Medi-
caid § 1915(c) HCBS waiver programs.1 78 They concluded that
concerns about quality of care could be grouped into the follow-
ing three categories: difficulty in monitoring noninstitutional
care, inexperience in monitoring noninstitutional care, and im-
pact of low provider reimbursement rates on quality of care. 179
a. Difficulty in Monitoring Noninstitutional Care
According to Lutzky's 2000 report, it is more difficult to
monitor the quality of care provided in group homes or smaller
residential settings than it is to monitor care in large institutions
174 id.
175 Id.
176 As stated earlier in Part ILA, and as was evidenced in the lawsuits of the
1970's and 1980's, large-scale/institutional environments do not necessarily support
quality of care. Instead, reality has shown that monitoring of care provisions in insti-
tutional settings were not widely successful.
177 See LurZKY Er AL., supra note 8, at 4, 25.
178 LTZKy FT AL., supra note 8. It is important to note that this is a review of
HCBS waiver programs across the country and does not specifically or individually
address elements of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's § 1915(c) waiver plan.
179 Id. at 25-26.
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because smaller settings receive less "public traffic" and cli-
ents/participants are more "dispersed." 18 The number of smaller
licensed residential settings serving people with MR/DD has
grown dramatically; while there were 14,700 such settings in
1982, the number grew to 104,800 in 1998.181 Currently,
MR/DD waiver programs "serve approximately twice as many
recipients as [do] institutions."'1 82 Reports by county auditors
not infrequently found gross deficiencies in the quality of care,
resulting in recommendations for "improved screening for new
adult foster home operators, enhanced monitoring, more consis-
tent imposition of sanctions, and greater coordination with citi-
zens and professionals to identify problem homes."
'1 83
b. Inexperience in Monitoring Noninstitutional Care
Lutzky and colleagues similarly point to individual States'
inexperience at monitoring quality in the home and community
settings. According to these authors, "states have not estab-
lished regulations or licensing requirements for certain types of
residential alternatives."'1 84 Lutzky and colleagues assert that
homes and settings that are not equipped to serve as skilled
nursing facilities are increasingly taking on more responsibili-
ties and more complex patients/clients and yet are still subject
to minimal regulation, potentially resulting in diminishing re-
turns in terms of the quality of services provided to consum-
ers. 
18 5
To protect against such inexperience, plaintiffs' counsel is
to play an active role in monitoring the implementation of the
settlement agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel will re-
view information on the numbers of people who will receive
services pursuant to the settlement agreement and has plans to
contact individual plaintiffs to ensure that their needs are being
met. Thus, the plaintiffs need not rely on state monitoring of the
implementation process.
186
'go Id at 25.
181 Id at 26 (citation omitted).
"2 Id at 29.
'8' Id at 26.
184 I
185 id
186 Email from David Friedman, Counsel for Boulet Plaintiffs, Hill & Barlow,
to Margaret K. Feltz, Associate Attorney, McDermott, Will & Emery (Oct. 23, 2001)
(on file with author).
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c. Impact of Low Provider Reimbursement Rates on Quality of
Care
Finally, Lutzky and colleagues warn that "[s]tates may see
the reduction of rates paid to providers as an easy mechanism
for controlling costs; and community-based care organizations
may lack the organizational structure and lobbying power to
fight rate reductions possessed by the nursing facility indus-
try."187 Quoting a provider association representative from Ore-
gon, Lutzky summarized the negative impact of low provider
reimbursement rates on quality of care, stating that it seems that
the State is 'balancing its budget on the backs of providers." 88
Challenges surrounding provider reimbursement in the home
and community settings have recently moved to the courtroom,
with plaintiffs arguing that disparate benefit and salary struc-
tures in the institutional versus HCBS markets are forcing dis-
abled individuals to live in more restrictive institutional settings
(a potential Olmstead violation) and are violating the ADA by
discriminating on the basis of disability.189 The impact of pro-
vider reimbursement rates on quality of care (and, potentially,
quality of life) simply cannot be underestimated.
Measuring the quality of care also presents challenges, for
mechanisms normally used in the acute care realm do not read-
ily translate to the long-term care environment. The fact that
goals in the long-term care environment are not always clearly
defined and often vary between the different parties involved
(i.e., administrators, providers, clients, families) further compli-
cates the situation. 19 Similarly, the fact that the condition of
many individuals in long-term care does not improve despite
oftentimes intensive treatment further complicates these as-
sessments.
191
187 LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
188 Id. (quoting L.M.B. ALECXIH ET AL., ESTIMATED CosT SAVINGS FROM THE
USE OF HoME AND COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO NuRSING FACILITY CARE IN
THREE STATES (1996)).
'8I See Interveners' Am. Compl., Ball v. Biedess, No. CIV 00-67 TUC ACM
(D. Ariz. 2000) (describing plaintiffs' allegations that they were denied HCBS ser-
vices because the provider claimed they were unable to find sufficient workers at
their wage levels); Compl., Sanchez v. Johnson, No. 00-CV-01 593 (CW) (N.D. Cal.
2000) (challenging the HCBS provider's criteria and methods of administration and
payment); Supra Part IILB.3.
190 LuTZKy ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
191 Id.
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2. Monitoring Mechanisms
Efforts to ensure quality of care include licensing, certifica-
tion, and regulatory requirements for providers and care sites as
well as monitoring of care activities. 192 Because service provid-
ers in many waiver programs are unskilled, these sites do not
have the built-in quality controls that are often found in skilled
nursing facilities, ICF/MR's, and other institutional settings. 1
93
Much of the monitoring in the HCBS environments is pro-
grammatic monitoring, rather than provider monitoring, result-
ing in what Lutzky and colleagues refer to as a regulatory 'hole'
left with regard to unskilled long-term care workers. 194 States
typically have relied on traditional monitoring practices such as
credential checks and records reviews, on-site inspections, un-
announced inspections, and "public" sanctions, which have pro-
vided incentives for improvements in quality of care.195 With
community-based care provisions, however, these monitoring
mechanisms come at a significant financial cost because care
sites are so dispersed. With 240 individual waiver programs,
196
each with a multitude of care sites, on-site monitoring presents
significant logistical challenges.
Case management and care management have been another
means of monitoring the quality of care provided. When case
managers maintain regular contact with clients and service pro-
viders, they can provide valuable input to a patient's quality of
care. Large caseloads have impeded this monitoring mechanism,
as have the lack of unified procedures to address problems that
are identified by a case manager. 19
7
Relying on client input as a means of monitoring quality
care has both benefits and drawbacks. Some States have estab-
lished hotlines or ombudsman programs to address consumer
complaints regarding HCBS providers. 198 As Lutzky and col-
192 Id at 27.
193 id
194 Id. at 28 (citing PROGRAM EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY Div., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-94-19, LONG-TERM CARE: STATUS OF QUAL-
ITY ASSURANCE AND MEASUREMENT IN HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES tbl.3
(1994); Elanor D. Kinney et al., Quality Improvement in Community-Based, Long-
Term Care: Theory and Reality, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 60, 63 (1994)).195 id
196 HCBS, supra note 9, 8.
197 LurzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 28.
198 I'
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leagues point out, however, it is important to realize the very
real limitations that exist in soliciting client complaints as a
means of monitoring program quality. Lutzky warns that "the
most vulnerable populations, such as those with cognitive im-
pairments and those who lack adequate informal support, are
unlikely to complain through formal channels. Consumers may
also be reluctant to file a complaint against a service provider
out of fear of losing services that are essential to them.'
99
3. Cost Control Mechanisms
HCFA and the individual States have been cautious about
the expansion of HCBS waiver programs. In part, this is a result
of fears that individuals would 'come out of the woodwork'
looking for Medicaid-funded HCBS services.200 State control
mechanisms in the HCBS realm include a limit on program ap-
propriations in state budgets, caps on the spending per recipient
under a waiver plan, or caps on the number of individuals
served under the waiver. 20 1 Other mechanisms employed to help
control or limit costs include: capitalizing on funds from other
sources to make waiver funds go further, case management,
prior authorization requirements, nurse delegation (i.e., the em-
ployment of non-licensed caregivers to perform certain medical
services, thereby making the provision of services less costly,
but also potentially compromising quality of care), estate recov-
ery plans, information tracking to monitor costs and recovery
claims, and utilizing alternate residential care environments,
such as apartment communities, that operate under economy of
scale principles.20 2
4. Segregation of the MR/DD Population into Classes
Another real concern that arises as the result of the initiation of
class action Medicaid litigation to achieve gains for the men-
tally retarded and developmentally disabled has been the crea-
tion of distinct classes or groups represented by particular law-
suits. In bringing the Boulet lawsuit-or any similar lawsuit-
did the plaintiffs and their attorneys simply succeed in creating
'99 Id at 29.
2 KuLKARNI, supra note 28, § I; PERKINS & KULKARNI, supra note 30, at 1.
201 LTzKY ET AL., supra note 8, at 29-30; see supra Part BII (discussing ex-
amples of caps within the Boulet litigation).
202 LurzKY Er AL., supra note 8, at 30-31.
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a class that excluded other MR/DD individuals who were also in
need of Medicaid-funded health care services?20 3 Concerns over
evenhandedness, "line jumping," and the creation of a void as a
result of class action litigation can be realities. 204 Does class
action Medicaid litigation ultimately create a vacuum that
leaves some vulnerable and deserving populations without ser-
vices? Does one lawsuit produce the domino effect, forcing sub-
sequent litigation, as that is the only way for distinct popula-
tions of MR/DD individuals to find a voice to advocate for their
medical needs ?205
B. Recommended Approach to Securing Medicaid-Funded
Services for the Mentally Retarded/Developmentally Disabled
A recent article discussing the Olmstead decision that ap-
peared in the Journal of Poverty Law and Policy recommended
that before initiating litigation under Olmstead, "advocates
[should] focus on policy advocacy for remedying unnecessary
institutionalization of individuals with disabilities., 206 The au-
thors, Ira Burnim and Jennifer Mathis of the Judge David L.
Bazelton Center for Mental Health Law in Washington, D.C.,
based their recommendation on an assessment that "the time is
ripe for political activity in this area." 20 7 While their recommen-
dations applied specifically to litigation involving Olmstead's
ADA integration mandate, valuable lessons can be drawn from
their advice.
Burnim and Mathis advise that advocates should urge
States to expand the provision of services in small community
residential programs; advocate that States expand HCBS and
demonstration waiver programs; and encourage States to maxi-
203 Telephone conversation with Gail Grossman, Deputy Assistant Commis-
sioner, Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation (Mar. 2001); see also Ira
Burnim & Jennifer Mathis, After Olmstead v. L.C.: Enforcing the Integration Man-
date of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 633 (2000) (recommending that advocates should use the Olmstead decision
as a policy tool, but also reviewing litigation elements).
204 See Burnim & Mathis supra note 203, at 646 (discussing evenhandedness
in the context of the Olmstead litigation).
205 Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that their "experience in Boulet has been very
positive-our settlement agreement results in additional funding for services, above
and beyond the funding that would have been dedicated to the Department of Mental
Retardation." Email from David Friedman, supra note 186.
206 Burnim & Mathis supra note 203, at 636.
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mize the use of federal block grant money, federal housing as-
sistance programs, federal disability benefits under the Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) program, state general fund ap-
propriations for mental disability services, and resources created
by downsizing existing state-run institutions.2 Similarly, they
state that "[a]dvocates should insist on being involved in formu-
lating and implementing any plan for remedying needless insti-
tutionalization." 20 9 In securing a plan, these authors recommend
that advocates work through coalitions of disability advocates,
for the "[a]dvocates' approach to policy advocacy, as well as its
success, will depend on advocates' strength and their relation-
ships with the state. 210 Generally speaking, only after advocacy
efforts are exhausted do these authors suggest turning to litiga-
tion as a means of obtaining desired outcomes on behalf of the
population with MR/DD.
In all cases-either in Olmstead litigation or in other Medi-
caid litigation meant to secure resources and services for the
mentally retarded and developmentally disabled-cooperative
participation of advocates, consumers, state officials, and other
interested parties is the best approach and almost certainly "the
best course . . . will be to wait rather than rush to the court-
house. 211 In the end, "[e]ven if little or nothing comes of the
state's efforts, [to cooperatively address the needs of individuals
with MR/DD,] advocates will be in a much better position to
litigate later" for "[t]hey will have educated themselves through
involvement in the state's planning and can avoid the political
costs of being perceived as having 'sued first and asked ques-
tions later. ' ,
212
At the same time, however, Burnim and Mathis suggest that
advocates should be wary of what they call a State's 'obfuscate
and delay' approach, which may result in long timelines and
nonexistent state efforts to address the needs of these vulnerable
populations.213 While the adage "timing is everything" might be
invoked to suggest a cautionary "wait and see" approach, there
is also something to be said for "striking while the iron is hot."
Use of genuine threats of litigation, or the actual initiation of
203id
209 id
210 Id
211 Id at 637.
212 Id
213 Id
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litigation itself, are sometimes enough to prompt a State to ad-
dress the needs of disabled individuals.
The approach in the Boulet case adopted many of the tac-
tics suggested by Burnim and Mathis and was further enhanced
by taking special account of some of the more problematic
characteristics of HCBS waiver programs. While the district
court opinion does not indicate that the suggested "wait and
see" approach was adopted, litigation may have been the most
effective means of terminating a potential "obfuscate and delay"
tactic contemplated by the Commonwealth. 1 4 By engaging in
litigation, the plaintiffs' attorneys in Boulet addressed what can
only be described as a very real problem with the State's wait-
ing list for residential habilitation services. In bringing a class
action lawsuit, they succeeded in securing Medicaid-funded out-
of-home services for more than 2,000 individuals. Using litiga-
tion as a tool to effectively produce change, the plaintiffs' at-
torneys also avoided some of the potential pitfalls of Medicaid
lawsuits through the use of creative negotiating and drafting
during the settlement phase of the case.
Litigation, in this. case, provided the impetus for change.
While the relationship between the defendants and the plaintiffs
in this case was, at times, tenuous and seemingly adversarial,
together, the two parties successfully achieved a sound result in
concluding settlement negotiations. By advocating aggressively
on behalf of the class, plaintiffs' attorneys were able to secure
several key points in settlement. Plaintiffs were able to earmark
some $29 million in base funds toward the provision of residen-
tial services on behalf of their clients and were similarly suc-
cessful in securing an additional $85 million in new appropria-
tions for use in the same purpose. They secured interim services
on behalf of their clients and, with the agreement and coopera-
tion of defense counsel, structured a realistic timeline for the
214 Undeniably, a waiting period of three to ten years is simply too long to
expect an individual to wait for necessary services to which they are entitled. It is
important to note that at least part of this delay was outside of the control of the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation. As Judge Woodlock wrote:
This passage illustrates an irony presented by this lawsuit. In this and other
reports, DMR has shown a clear concern for individuals on its waiting list
and a desire to address the problem that the list presents. In large part, the
waiting list appears to be the result of resource allocation choices outside
of DMR's control, and DMR has urged legislative action to correct the
situation.
Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2000).
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rectification of the waitlist dilemma. Built into the settlement
agreement were some monitoring mechanisms (i.e., quarterly
reports, biannual meetings, etc.) and an "escape clause" permit-
ting a return to litigation channels if the settlement agreement is
not followed.
Other goals, such as the active involvement of clients and
families in the creation of sufficient care plans and the fair and
competitive pay of providers, could not be achieved through the
Boulet litigation. Success on these fronts might depend on ad-
vocacy efforts and lobbying efforts, regulation of the HCBS set-
ting or legislation to standardize care provision. This combined
approach, which has its roots in litigation, but draws signifi-
cantly upon legislative, regulatory, and advocacy components,
will ultimately produce the best result in the current Medicaid
litigation environment.
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POST SCRIPT
On November 21, 2001, almost five months after its July 1,
2001 due date, the Massachusetts legislature passed its fiscal
year 2002 budget of $22.6 billion, which resulted in cuts of
$650 million.215 These drastic cuts, an attempt to help meet a
$1.4 billion budget deficit, 216 were dubbed the 'Thanksgiving
massacre' by several lobbyists and advocacy groups who rallied
to reverse the budget cuts. 2
17
Among the hardest hit by the budget cuts was the Depart-
ment of Mental Retardation, which suffered deletion of $22 mil-
lion worth of annualized funding218 mandated under the Boulet
settlement agreement. Gerald Morrissey, Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Retardation assessed the bleak situation
following the elimination of settlement funds:
The Department has already committed approximately
$9.8 million of this appropriation to cover approxi-
mately one-third of the new placements as well as all of
the interim family support services, and does not have
$9.8 million elsewhere in the budget. Eighty-four indi-
viduals who have already been placed in FY02 would
likely have the residential services provided under the
agreement taken away, requiring them in most instances
to return home.219
Addressing the elimination of settlement funds, Leo V.
Sarkissian, Executive Director of the Association of Retarded
Citizens of Massachusetts simply said, '[t]here's no way to
make this painless. Reversal must be pursued.' 220 Plaintiffs' at-
torney Neil McKittrick promised a return to litigation if funding
was not restored: "'To say the least, it's a little frustrating'....
215 Rick Klein, Deal Would Restore Some Budget Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
13, 2001, at B4 [hereinafter Budget Cuts].
216 Rick Klein, Lawmakers OK $22.6B Budget at the Wire, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 22, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Budget at the Wire].217 Rick Klein, Advocates Looking to Neutralize 'Massacre' Groups Rally to
Restore Elderly, DMR Funding, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 2001, at B1 [hereinafter
DMR Funding].
218 Eileen McNamara, Defenseless to Fight Back BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28,
2001, at B 1.
219 
Fr220 DMR Funding, supra note 2 17.
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'If the money's not there, there will be no services. If the ser-
vices aren't provided, we're going to end up back in court.' 221
In an attempt to obtain a reversal of the budget cuts other
than through litigation, Sarkissian and plaintiffs' attorneys or-
ganized a demonstration to protest the multi-million dollar
budget cuts effecting the Department of Mental Retardation.2 2
After a week's worth of intensive pressure from advocacy
groups, legislative leaders decided on December 13, 2001 that
they would restore funding to a variety of programs, including
the Department of Mental Retardation, 3 by passing an $85 mil-
lion supplemental budget.224 While the supplemental budget
does help to meet the needs of hundred of MR/DD individuals
by restoring the $22 million in annualized funding promised in
the Boulet settlement, countless other individuals are less fortu-
nate. "'[The supplemental budget] makes some modest restora-
tions to the most egregious cuts, but we are still just putting
Band-Aids on deep and open wounds,' said Stephen E. Collins,
Executive Director of the Massachusetts Human Services Coali-
tion.
225
The fact that the proposed House and Senate budget allo-
cated no money to satisfy the Boulet settlement raises interest-
ing issues that are beyond the scope of this Note, but merit brief
mention. What happens when a court-mandated settlement
agreement is ignored? What is the relief available? The Boulet
plaintiffs rallied, organizing themselves, demonstrated, and ef-
fectively used the press to champion their cause. But what if
their efforts had been ineffective? Plaintiffs' attorneys were
successful at exerting political pressure, calling on state repre-
sentatives to enact a change and enforce the settlement man-
dated by the courts. And, if they were unsuccessful at enacting
change through non-litigation channels, plaintiffs' counsel was
prepared to go back to court to secure adequate Medicaid ser-
vices to which their clients were entitled.
221 Budget at the Wire, supra note 216.
22 DMR Funding, supra note 217.
m The proposed $85 million supplemental budget included allocations for
adult education ($12.5 million), AIDS ($2.5 million), the Department of Mental
Health ($16.6 million), the Department of Mental Retardation ($33.3 million, includ-
ing $15 million of the $22 million mandated under the Boulet settlement), and the
Department of Correction ($14 million). Budget Cuts, supra note 215.224 See id.
= Id.L
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One lesson-unfortunate, but true-that the Boulet plain-
tiffs learned as a result of the Massachusetts budget debacle is
that even when all obstacles have seemingly been surmounted
and the case has been won, there is still the danger that the leg-
islature will ignore-and thereby invalidate-the ruling of the
courts. The road ahead for the Boulet plaintiffs and their coun-
sel seems long. In addition to monitoring the implementation of
the settlement, they must remain alert and ever-ready to return
to court to secure the rights to which they and other MR/DD
individuals in the Commonwealth are entitled, for it seems that
only through vigilance will their rights be upheld.
